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FEATURE COMMENT: Understanding
The Current Wave Of Procurement
Reform—Devolution Of The
Contracting Function
When the Bush Administration began, the procurement community wondered how the new Administration would shape procurement policy.
“Competitive sourcing” under Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 clearly was (and
remains) a priority, but it is in many ways a sideshow to procurement reform. See, e.g., “OFPP
Declares Public-Private Competitions a Success,”
47 GC ¶ 66. After the September 11 attacks, and
after wars were launched in Afghanistan and
Iraq, many wondered if homeland security or foreign contracting would become the focus of reform.
What has become clearer in recent months,
however, is that, at least for the foreseeable future, procurement reform will focus on the procurement function itself—on how goods and services are bought, and on who buys them. See,
e.g., “OFPP Issues New Policy Letter on Developing and Managing the Acquisition Workforce,”
47 GC ¶ 187. The pending defense authorization
bills, which contain a hodge-podge of reforms
aimed at procurement standards and the acquisition workforce, see “HASC Approves Defense
Authorization Measure,” 47 GC ¶ 242; “SASC Defense Authorization Bill Addresses DOD Acquisition Challenges,” 47 GC ¶ 230, confirm this trend
in procurement reform.
This FEATURE COMMENT suggests that we can
make sense of the defense authorization bills’
proposed reforms by focusing on what seems to
be Congress’ common purpose in these provisions: to bring order to a procurement function
that is rapidly devolving away from the Govern4-029-661-4

ment user. In other words, perhaps we can understand these measures as Congress’ effort to control
the devolution of procurement—what some might
call the “outsourcing” of the contracting function.
How the Contracting Function Devolves—
Let’s begin our analysis with the user, the ultimate
customer who uses the goods and services bought
through the acquisition process. In the private sector, it’s normally the user who buys a firm’s goods
and services, subject to oversight and approvals by
others in the enterprise. The private-sector user/purchaser is generally responsible for ensuring that the
purchase represents the “best value” to the firm. The
user/purchaser can be held accountable for failed purchases, and will, at least in theory, be rewarded for
purchases that add value to the firm.
Although purchasing authority in a private firm
may be aggregated in a specific function (for example, to gain economies of scale or to facilitate strategic purchasing), seldom do we see what we might
call a “contracting officer” in a private corporation—
someone to whom others in the firm have delegated
purchasing authority, simply so that authority will
reside in one person.
Why, then, has the Government systematically
taken purchasing authority out of the hands of users,
and given it to contracting officials? If the user (or,
in practical terms, the program official) is the most
visible individual for Congress to hold accountable,
and is in the best position to identify “best value” purchases for the Government, why has purchasing authority devolved to contracting professionals in the
Government?
There are many reasons, many of them sound,
to devolve procurement authority from the user (typically a program manager) to a contracting official.
Devolution reduces risks that funds will be misspent—
by consolidating purchasing in a few contracting officials’ hands, monitoring costs can be reduced—and
helps to ensure that procurement rules will be consistently followed. We should recognize, though, that
devolution has costs, because there are inefficiencies
inherent in shifting purchasing authority to a sepa-
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rate class of officials. Congress bears at least some
of the blame here, for, by burdening the procurement process with layer after layer of special procurement requirements, Congress has in effect
made it impossible not to shift many forms of purchasing out of users’ hands.
Shifting the purchasing function into the hands
of professional contracting officials was merely the
first step in the “procurement devolution.” Under
this traditional contracting paradigm, procurement
was done mainly by the customer agencies themselves, by in-house contracting personnel.
Second and Third Devolutions: to Centralized Purchasing Agencies, and Now to the Private Sector—A number of factors combined, however, to move that purchasing function one step
further, out of the hands of agency contracting personnel. One factor was the slow, grinding decline
in agencies’ acquisition workforces. See, e.g., General Accounting Office, Defense Acquisition Organizations: Changes in Cost and Size of Civilian Structures, at 1 (GAO/NSIAD-96-46, Nov. 1995), available
at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96046.pdf.
By 1999, the civilian acquisition workforce had
fallen to 124,000, which, by GAO’s estimate, was
roughly half of its size a decade before. See General Accounting Office, Acquisition Workforce: Department of Defense’s Plans to Address Workforce
Size and Structure Challenges, at 2 (GAO-02-630,
April 2002), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d02630.pdf. The slide accelerated,
thanks, in part, to the marked aging of the civilian
workforce in the Defense Department. See, e.g.,
Statement of Dr. Diane M. Disney, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Civilian Personnel Policy, Department of Defense (May 18, 2000), available at http:
//hsgac.senate.gov/051800_Diseny.htm.
Another factor in this “second devolution” was
the rise in interagency contracts, which allow agencies to meet their needs through other agencies’
contracting efforts. See Steven L. Schooner, “Risky
Business: Managing Interagency Acquisition,” 47
GC ¶ 156; “Interagency Contracts for Interrogation
Services Lacked Adequate Oversight,” 47 GC ¶ 214.
Interagency contracts were celebrated by the
Clinton Administration, and they exploded in size
partly because some of the agencies sponsoring
those contracts, such as the Federal Supply Service
in the General Services Administration, lost their
traditional appropriations in the mid-1990s. To sur-
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vive, these “entrepreneurial” agencies had to sell
contracting services to other agencies. See, e.g.,
“New GSA Audit Cites ‘Significant Deficiencies’ in
CSCs’ Contract Compliance,” 47 GC ¶ 2.
The role of these centralized purchasing agencies is, of course, tremendously important. Centralized purchasing agencies can leverage enormous Government demand for far better price and
quality terms. See, e.g., General Services Administration, Proposed Organizational Design of GSA’s
Federal Acquisition Service (May 31, 2005) (describing mission of consolidated acquisition service),
available at www.gsa.gov/gsa/cm_attachments/
GSA_BASIC/FTS-FSS-REORG-DRAFT_Plan_R2w-p9-m_0Z5RDZ-i34K-pR.doc; Directive 2004/18/
EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the Coordination of Procedures for the Award of Public Works Contracts,
Public Supply Contracts and Public Service Contracts, Article 11 (April 30, 2004) (EU Directive recognizes centralized purchasing agencies), available
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/
publicprocurement/legislation_en.htm#package. At
the same time, however, if the role of centralized
purchasing agencies is not carefully focused, the
centralized purchasing agencies can too quickly
slip from their missions—and thus, in essence, dissipate efficiencies gained by devolving purchasing
authority to these centralized agencies.
Over the past decade, the second devolution
of procurement authority (to centralized purchasing agencies) was accelerated by two important innovations: (1) the Government’s embrace of commercial items, see FAR pt. 12, and (2) the rise of
indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity task-and
delivery-order contracts—what the Europeans call
“framework” contracts. See, e.g., Sue Arrowsmith,
“Case Comment, Framework Agreements Under
the UK Procurement Regulations: The Denfleet
Case,” 2005 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. NA86.
By offering commercial items on IDIQ contracts, the entrepreneurial centralized purchasing
agencies were able to resolve many of the traditional obstacles to interagency contracting. Traditionally, “customer” agencies found it difficult to buy
through other agencies, because the “customer”
agencies couldn’t always ensure that the purchasing agencies would meet their needs. (See, e.g., Congress’ catastrophic experiment, through the Brooks
Act, in centralizing information technology purchas-
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ing in GSA.) Those problems fell away, however,
with commercial items offered, on a unit basis, on
interagency IDIQ contracts: the centralized purchasing agencies could offer their customer agencies an almost infinite array of standardized commercial products and services at competitive prices.
In essence, program officials (users) at the customer agencies could use the IDIQ contracts to
“reach through” the centralized purchasing agencies to buy directly from commercial vendors, but
with relatively little competition or paperwork.
Paradoxically, while nominal purchasing authority
thus ostensibly devolved yet another step away from
agency users, to centralized purchasing agencies,
at the same time purchasing choice may have
shifted back to the agency users.
Ironically, the innovations which made possible
the second devolution—the IDIQ contracts offering commercial items which made interagency contracting so popular—also propelled the third devolution, the Government’s decision to shift
purchasing authority into private hands. To the
extent GSA and the other purchasing agencies
have acted only as passive intermediaries between
agency “customers” and commercial-item contractors, ostensibly there seems little reason not to
shift the purchasing agencies’ functions to commercial intermediaries, if the commercial purchasing
firms are more efficient. Why, for example, should
Government customers use GSA’s clunky online
catalogue, http://www.gsaadvantage.gov, when
http://www.amazon.com is much faster and
easier? Indeed, § 812 of the pending House defense authorization bill, H.R. 1815, would require
federal agencies “to the maximum extent practicable, to use commercially available online procurement services to purchase commercial items.”
More on this below.
Looking Back on Devolution—and Forward—Now that the procurement system has gone
through at least three devolutions of procurement
power—from the user (a) to agency contracting officials, (b) to centralized purchasing agencies and
now (c) to private firms—we need to stop and ask
some basic questions. First, did it make sense to
devolve authority away from the Government user,
and, second, if it did, what controls do we need to
have in place?
An interesting way to assess these questions is
to treat the devolution as a form of “outsourcing.”

Though outsourcing is a useful conceptual framework, I should stress that this does not mean that
our analysis here should be distracted by “competitive sourcing.” “Competitive sourcing,” the
Government’s oddly idiosyncratic approach to
outsourcing, emphasizes cost reduction above all else,
and thus does not follow commercial outsourcing
theory, which assesses outsourcing against a much
more considered range of management goals. See,
e.g., Mohab T. Khattab, “Revised Circular A-76: Embracing Flawed Methodologies,” 34 Pub. Cont. L.J.
469 (Spring 2005); cf. OMB Memorandum M-05-12,
attachment at 1-2 (May 23, 2005) (A-76 process will
exclude contracting official positions from possible
elimination through competitive sourcing only if having contractors perform those functions would put
the agency’s core mission at “substantial risk”). To
make sense of our analysis here, we need to sidestep the conceptual mire of competitive sourcing.
Instead, we should assess devolution of the contracting function against traditional outsourcing
principles, to ask whether, at each step, it made
sense to shift the contracting function farther away
from the user. We should ask, for example,
whether devolving purchasing authority away from
the Government user allowed agencies to better
meet their core missions (see Mohab T. Khattab,
supra, at 506) and to access better, faster and
cheaper purchasing processes (see, e.g., Deloitte
Consulting, Calling a Change in the Outsourcing
Market: The Realities for the World’s Largest Organizations, at 5 (April 2005), available at http://
www.deloitte.com/dtt/cda/doc/content/
us_outsourcing_callingachange.pdf).
At the same time, we should be asking
whether shifting the procurement function progressively farther away from the user meant that the
Government accumulated additional costs or risks,
or lost flexibility or institutional knowledge. See
Deloitte Consulting, supra, at 5. Outsourcing demands careful quality controls, id. at 9-10, and we
should ask whether Congress and the agencies have
imposed sufficient quality controls on the devolved
procurement functions. Finally, under traditional
outsourcing principles, we should ask whether Government acquisition is in fact a unique and “propriety” part of the Government, and thus should
not be “outsourced.” See Mark Gottfredson, Rudy
Puryear & Stephen Phillips, “Strategic Sourcing:
From Periphery to the Core,” Harv. Bus. Rev., Feb.
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2005, at 6. While acquisition on its face may not
seem such a “core” function, since Government’s
legitimacy can turn, in part, on how “cleanly” its
procurement runs, perhaps procurement is, in fact,
a “strategic” function.
Standard commercial outsourcing theory is thus
a powerful analytical tool. Beyond giving us objective criteria to assess whether the contracting function should have devolved as it has, commercial
outsourcing analysis also suggests how the devolved
function should be controlled—and helps explain
Congress’ attempts at control.
Understanding Congress’ Response to
Devolution—Viewed against a backdrop of traditional commercial outsourcing principles, many provisions in the pending defense authorization bills
seem a classic attempt to address problems in “devolving”—“outsourcing,” in a very broad sense—the
procurement function.
For example, the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s central theme regarding procurement
reform was the committee’s belief “that continuing
problems [in contracting] are attributable, in significant part, to inadequate human capital planning
and continuing reductions in the defense acquisition workforce.” S. Rep. No. 109-69, 109th Cong.,
1st Sess. 344 (May 17, 2005). The committee
seemed, in other words, to be arguing that the Defense Department’s contracting ranks should be bolstered, so that the contracting functions on more
Defense procurements can “un-devolve” back to the
customer agency. The Senate committee’s pending
bill, S. 1042, reflects the committee’s intent to bolster contracting inside the Defense Department, for
the bill’s § 806 calls for the Defense Acquisition
University to conduct a thorough review of contracting gaps in the Department of Defense.
The “outsourcing” or “devolution” model helps
to illuminate many other parts of the Senate defense authorization bill, S. 1042, as it emerged from
the Senate Armed Services Committee. (Our focus
here is on Title VIII, the traditional vehicle for acquisition reform in the annual defense authorization acts.) Section 801 of the Senate bill, for example, requires a review to ensure that agencies
purchasing on the Defense Department’s behalf
comply with DOD requirements. This is a classic
problem (and response) in outsourcing, for buyers
will impose requirements to ensure that their
outsourced suppliers conform to the buyers’ stan-
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dard quality expectations. See, e.g., Deloitte Consulting, supra, at 10-12.
That principle of quality assurance is taken a
step further in § 822 of the Senate bill, which would
call for a review of ethics principles—arguably part
of the Government’s quality assurance system—
for contractor employees when those employees are
in “functions closely associated with inherently governmental functions,” or in “functions historically
performed by Government employees.” Viewed
through the prism of the “devolution” model, § 822
is arguably another effort—and an important effort—
to extend the Government’s performance quality
requirements to cover its newly “devolved” or
“outsourced” functions, including its acquisition functions.
Section 802 of the Senate bill seems to reflect
more of Congress’ efforts to “un-devolve” service
contracting functions back into the Defense Department. Over the past decade, much of the Defense Department’s services contracting has devolved to outside agencies, such as GSA’s Federal
Technology Service. Section 802 would probably
reverse that trend. Section 802 would set up special centers to coordinate the Defense Department’s services contracting, and would require
that these acquisition centers, located within the
Defense Logistics Agency and the various services,
eventually serve as the sole agents for purchasing contract services for the Department of Defense. See S. 1042, § 802(f) (“After September 30,
2009, no officer or employee of the Federal Government outside the Defense Contract Support
Acquisition Center[s] may, without ... prior written approval ... engage in a procurement action
for the acquisition of contract services for the Department of Defense that is valued in excess of the
simplified acquisition threshold. ...”). While § 802
raises its own concerns—it may in fact
overcentralize the purchasing of contract services—
it does reflect the Senate Armed Services
Committee’s intent to return contracting functions
to the Defense Department.
Similarly, § 804 would bar Defense agencies
from treating major weapon systems as “commercial items,” absent specific authorization from Congress. This initiative is a response to sharp criticism that commercial-item procurement authority
was being overused for major weapon systems. See,
e.g., Statement of the Hon. Joseph E. Schmitz, In-
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spector General, Department of Defense, before the
Airland Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services
Committee, on Air Force Acquisition Oversight
(April 14, 2005), available at www.dodig.mil/fo/
Testimony_DoDIG_4-14-05_Final11.pdf. Section 804
of the pending Senate bill would, in effect, slow or
stop the “devolution” of procurement authority over
major weapon systems, for typically only traditional
DOD procurement offices can shoulder “non-commercial” requirements such as cost accounting standards.
In the same vein, § 805 of the Senate bill would
effectively press for tighter “un-devolution” of the
procurement function, back into the customer procuring activity, for under § 805 Defense Department customer agencies would have to report how
much they paid other DOD agencies in fees for acquisitions. This again responds to a classic
outsourcing concern, that the outside firm is able
to charge its “captive” customer too much for its
outsourced services. See Deloitte Consulting, supra,
at 12.
Sections 831 and 832 of the Senate bill offer perhaps the clearest illustration that Congress—at
least in the Senate Armed Services Committee—
wants to “un-devolve” contracting functions back to
traditional contracting officials, but in a way that’s
mindful of the trade-offs inherent in outsourcing.
Section 831 of the Senate bill reflects blunt support:
it would shift millions of training dollars to the defense acquisition workforce. Section 832 of the Senate bill, in contrast, offers much more subtle—and
supple—evidence that Congress, too, understands
and is concerned by the “devolution” of the procurement function.
Section 832 would require the Defense Department to increase its acquisition workforce by
15 percent by Fiscal Year 2008, unless the secretary of defense determined that “the cost of increasing such workforce to the larger size [i.e.,
15 percent larger] ... would exceed the savings to
be derived from the additional oversight that
would be achieved by having a defense acquisition and support workforce of such larger size.”
Section 832 is thus built on the assumption that
broadening the defense acquisition workforce—
“un-devolving” the acquisition function back into
the Defense Department—will bring efficiencies,
but § 832 explicitly acknowledges that there may
be a point of diminishing returns to “reverse-devo-

lution,” impliedly because at least some of the
functions at issue can be performed more efficiently outside the Department. Thus, even if only
in a clumsy and open-ended sort of way, § 832
seems to acknowledge the cost-benefit tradeoffs
that should guide devolution.
Applying the Model to Controversial Aspects of the House Bill: Compulsory Use of
Electronic Procurement Functions, and Consolidation of the Boards—Perhaps the keenest
tests for the “devolution” model are the two provisions in the House authorization bill (H.R. 1815)
likely to prove the most controversial: § 812, which
requires the use of electronic online acquisition services, and Title XIV, which would consolidate the
boards of contract appeals into two boards, defense
and civilian. The House passed H.R. 1815 on May
25, with minimal debate. These provisions must,
therefore, be addressed, if at all, when the House
and Senate conferees meet to resolve their respective versions of the defense authorization bills.
As the House Armed Services Committee report explained, § 812 “would require the Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
to revise the [FAR] to maximize the use of commercially available online procurement services to
purchase commercial items, including those procurement services that allow the heads of federal
agencies to conduct reverse auctions.” H. Rep. No.
109-89, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (May 20, 2005).
Section 812, which would strongly favor the
use of reverse auctions and other “commercially
available procurement services,” raises a number
of technical issues. There are, for example, deep
concerns (both here and abroad) that reverse auctions need to be carefully controlled; see, e.g.,
Christopher R. Yukins & Don Wallace, Jr.,
“UNCITRAL Considers Electronic Reverse Auctions, as Comparative Public Procurement Comes
of Age in the U.S.,” 2005 Pub. Proc. L. Rev. (forthcoming), available in draft at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=711847.
Section 812 (which appears to have been imported,
intact, from Rep. Tom Davis’ pending bill, the Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA), H.R.
2067), is also completely unclear on which “commercially available online procurement services”
should be used. Does § 812 mean, as was suggested above, that GSA must abandon its electronic catalogue at http://www.gsaadvantage.gov,
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if there’s a better alternative at http://www.
amazon.com? Or should agencies use only those
online procurement services that focus on the federal sector—or only online reverse auctions? Section 812, which has not been the subject of public
debate, leaves these and many other technical
questions unanswered.
Putting those technical concerns aside, however, there’s a larger policy question to be resolved
here. By forcing agencies to devolve acquisition
functions into the private sector, § 812 may be the
epitome of the “third devolution,” the final shift of
Government acquisition authority into the private
sector. If so, acquisition authority will have slipped
from agency users, to agency contracting personnel, to centralized purchasing agencies, and now to
private “electronic” contractors, with no finding that
this final devolution enhances efficiency, or that
basic principles of transparency and accountability
will be preserved. (There may, of course, be enhanced efficiencies if these online services are, in
fact, tools which shift purchasing authority back
into the hands of agency users—but there is nothing in the legislative record to suggest that’s the
intent of § 812.) Until Congress can take a hard look
at § 812, the analytical model we’ve reviewed
above—the model which says that purchasing authority should be devolved or “outsourced” away
from the agency user only on a clear showing of
enhanced efficiency—suggests that § 812 is, at best,
premature.
The second acquisition provision likely to stir
real controversy, Title XIV of the House bill, would
consolidate the boards of contract appeals into two
new boards, one “civilian” and one “defense.” The
Bush administration has consistently supported
this initiative (see OMB, “Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 1815—National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,” at 5 (May 25,
2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
omb/legislative/sap/109-1/hr1815sap-h.pdf; “Developments in Brief: Administration Proposes to Consolidate Boards of Contract Appeals,” 44 GC ¶ 118;
Frederick J. Lees, “Consolidation of Boards of Contracts Appeals: An Old Idea Whose Time Has
Come?,” 33 Pub. Cont. L.J. 505 (Spring 2004)), and
the language of Title XIV was also apparently imported from Rep. Tom Davis’ pending bill, the Acquisition System Improvement Act (ASIA), H.R.
2067.
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The dispute function is naturally part of the acquisition process, and the “devolution” analytical
model helps us understand where, optimally, that
function should be placed. Leaving the disputeresolution function with the user or the CO would,
of course, probably be unworkable, because of the
conflicts of interest that would arise. (The fact,
though, that the Contract Disputes Act does, indeed, vest the CO with initial authority to review
contractor claims (see 41 USCA § 605) suggests that
the optimal location for final dispute resolution may,
on reflection, not be too far from the CO.)
The CDA left final dispute resolution authority
with boards of contracts appeals in the several
agencies, and with the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims. The boards have generally been viewed as
a success, for on the whole the boards have been
professional, objective, efficient and deeply familiar with their agencies. Consolidation of the boards,
if it occurs, thus will occur not because of breakdown in the boards’ function, but rather largely because their workloads have declined. See Frederick
J. Lees, supra, at 508 (“Consolidation of the boards
is in the interest of management, efficiency,
economy, and reduction in the number of sets of
procedural rules involved. ...”); Steven L. Schooner
& Keith D. Coleman, “The CDA at Twenty: A Brief
Assessment of BCA Activity,” The Procurement
Lawyer (ABA), Summer 1999, at 10 (review of BCA
workload statistics).
Consolidating the civilian boards (the current
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals would
remain largely unchanged under the proposed legislation) would mean, however, shifting some part
of the acquisition authority (the disputes authority)
away from the acquiring agencies, to a consolidated
board. As with any devolution of procurement authority, though this consolidation might bring efficiencies, it also raises risks if an unaccountable,
centralized board were left to resolve other agencies’ disputes.
The House defense authorization bill seems to
address this risk by placing authority for the civilian board—including authority to oversee the appointment of board judges—directly into the hands
of the OFPP administrator, in the Office of Management and Budget. That office, however, has historically done very poorly in overseeing the boards
(see, e.g., John A. Howell, “The Role of the Office
of Federal Procurement Policy in the Management
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of the Boards of Contract Appeals: From Great Expectations to Paradise Lost?,” 28 Pub. Cont. L.J.
559 (1999)), and there is an abiding concern that
OFPP, which is an important arm of the President’s
Management Agenda, could in turn politicize the
boards. The “devolution” model discussed above—
the assumption that the procurement function
should, where possible, remain as close as practicable to the customer agency, to ensure that the
function remains aligned with the agency’s core
mission—suggests that primary authority for the
boards (however configured) should, if possible, stay
with the executive agencies.
Conclusion—As the discussion above reflects,
procurement reform now centers, in many ways,
on controlling acquisition functions that have “devolved” away from agency users. Devolution thus
helps to explain many potential reforms, including
many of the acquisition reforms currently pending
before Congress. Because devolution of the acquisition function is, at bottom, arguably a form of
outsourcing, we can draw on established management theories of outsourcing to gauge where that
devolution is likely to succeed, and where it is likely
to fail.
This FEATURE COMMENT was written for THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR by Christopher R. Yukins,
associate professor of Government contract
law, The George Washington University Law
School.
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